Material and Spiritual Culture
Instructions to Homework S.I

Posted on March 27, 2012 by witmar

Dear Students

To obtain credit for  the course on International Cultural Relations lectured in Polish, you should display also an elementary knowledge of English. The opportunity of  exercising  your English will consist in answering those homework questions which have been stated in English, namely items 14 and 15, at the list of questions regarding Lecture I. These are as follows.

14) Compare the definition of material culture as given byMerriam-Webster Dictionary:

material culture = the totality of physical objects made by a people for the satisfaction of their needs; esp : those articles requisite for the sustenance and perpetuation of life.

with the definition found in the lecture “Kultura duchowa a kultura materialna“,  Section §3.2. Do these definitions agree in their content, at least partially? If they agree, what does the agreement consist in?

15) Use the story “Material culture: getting and spending“, which tells about English material culture in the Georgian period,   to answer question 9 (referring to Section §3).  Note that the same product may be included in the both domains of culture. If this is the case, explain  reasons of such inclusion.

How to produce your homework  as a comment on this post

1)  At the very  end of this post, you find option  “leave a comment”. After you click it, you obtain the box to put your homework  thre in the form of a comment.

2) At the top of your text you should  list the following data:  Group MSK-St,  your full name,  your e-mail.

3) After finishing  the text, you click the option “post comment”.

4)  The comments should be submitted  till  April, the 10-th,  2012. Those sent  later will  not be ackowledged,  unless the author apologizes, and gives  a reasonable explanation of the delay.

The highest grade for exam performances,  namely “5″, is to be given for scoring 100 points for two homeworks (the next in May), 50 points for each them.

Posted in Political axiology, Rationalism in Politics, Uncategorized | Leave a comment

III. Smart governmental politics to advance
the cognitive power of free market

Posted on November 12, 2011 by witmar

This post continues the one entitled “Roubini’s conceptual apparatus [...]“.

1. Computational power as a kind of cognitive power

Had Adam Smith lived in our times,  instead of  “market’s invisible hand” he might have  preferred the phrase  “market’s invisible computer”.  For it is an axiom of classical economics that the free market  functions like a device to calculate an optimal state of economy.  Such an analogy has become popular due to the long Friedrich Hayek’s  dispute with Oskar Lange.  The latter was the Polish socialist economist,  who believed that the central socialist planning will  prove efficient owing to computer simulations of free market, while Hayek was aware  that  such a tricky virtual   market  could not match  the real one in its computational power.

Following  this metaphor, let us ask the question: does such computer need a programmer?  In Smith’s perspective, the answer would be, presumably: “yes it is  the  good Lord himself  who has programmed it”. If  you dislike  invoking God’s name in vain,  you may replace it with the phrase “self-organizing Universe”. In either case the question arises: does  the executing  of program need a human assistance?  There appears an illuminating analogy with automated reasoning: often it succeeds when being  executed by computer alone,  but in  most  complex cases  it needs prompting  or controlling  by a  human reasoner.

I resort here to the ideas of computational power and computability, though they belong to very sophisticated concepts of mathematical logic and theoretical computer science; hence their definitions, should they be duly precise, would require many preparatory steps.  However,  with  referring to our everyday experience with computers, we can approximate these ideas  to  some  extent  – to use them as useful metaphors, or models, also  in  the field of economy.

For instance, with successive upgradings of the softeware, my computer ever more knows how to  perform ever more complex tasks. In this sense,  there increases its  power which we call  computational,  for all  such  tasks are being performed by computing.  Since  my computer may be thereby said  to  “know more”,  its computational power turns out a kind of cognitive power.

There are other kinds of  cognitive power, not being computational.  To see the difference, let us compare two kinds of  mathematical cognition. If one computes the  circumference of a circle according to an algorithm (capable of being  rendered as a program), then he  uses his brain’s computational power. However,  when he accepts  intuitively,  as being obvious,  the axioms of arithmetic and geometry (from which there follows the algorithm in question),  he makes use of a cognitive power different from the ability of computation; this power is ofted called  intellectual intuition.

In economic matters, both  varieties of cognitive power come into play. There are calculations, and there are intuitive acts  of cognition. The latter  include seing  significance of  certain problems, accepting certain assumptions,  recognizing  some mathematical models as  useful for predictions, etc.

Cognitive power is enjoyed not  only by individual market agents but also by free market as an overall system of information processing. Its main job consists in computing  prices, each price as the function of  a set of variables,  especially  demand and supply.  In this sense Smith’s dictum may be paraphrased as “invisible action of a computer”.  However,  let  us return to the question posed above (see the second paragraph):  given the fact that complexity of some computations needs a support from an intuitively reasoning agent,  one may ask about the following analogy.  May it be so  that  the complexity of social life (which involves supply-demand relationship) needs deliberate state intervention to protect public interests, apart from  market’s mechanisms? In other words: are there any circumstances in which state control over prices would be a smart strategy to advance public interests? On this point there are divergent appoaches, one of Keynes, the other one of the Austrian Economic School,  brilliantly represented by Hayek.

2.  The interplay of spontaneous market and state’s economic control

To take a well considered  stance toward the  Hayek-Keynes disagreement, that concerning market’s and government’s  impact on  the demand-supply relations,  we should link this controversy with the idea of computability;  it is the latter which plays the key role in the Hayek-Lange dispute.  The free market is a reliable device to compute optimal prices, optimal strategies etc., provided  that all its agents are fully rational and fully honest. Any deviations from these ideal  conditions result in errors of computing.   The more complex  become economic  processes,  the  less  there  is likely  to attain a perfect rationality.  The grater gains are at stake, the more people happen to be drawn away from the virtue of honesty. To become free from such deviations,  the market needs a control by  competent authorities, smart enough to establish reasonable  rules of market game.

Moreover, such a control may be needed because of  interference of various social interests,  and of multiple government strategies,  as  to protect  the poorest parts of population,  to support  export and reduce import, etc.  These purposes may be attained with such instruments as subsidies, tariffs, loans, taxes etc. Such measures can be directed towards definite sections or sections,  e.g. subsidies for food production,  highly advantageous loans for housing,  tariffs on definite kinds of goods, etc.

There is the extreme view (sometimes called libertarian) which denies  governments any right to interfere with markets. To  support  such a contention, one should prove that market agents always  are fully rational, that is, doing correct computations, and  invariably respecting moral  claims. However,  neither is the case.  Market agents happen to commit various errors: sometimes they use false premisses in their predictions   (e.g. some years  ago  they superestimated the potential of Greek economy),  yield to the panic,  have a propensity to engage in speculative bubbles, etc. These are  intellectual errors,  to wit lapses in calculation.  Morever,  market agents happen to  transgress moral standards when their self-interest blinds them to public interest, when they tend to monopolistic power, when they do selfish lobbying, etc.

In such state of affairs there are at least three reasons for  the interaction  of political power with  market forces.  First  of all, there  is the absolute need of legal system to enable the very existence of free market in modern societies.  No economic  action would be possible,  if the state failed to create  a system of economic law  including  financial and banking law, law of companies etc.  This is  an essential state’s contribution to making economic processes predictable and transparent,  and thus obtaining the trait  of computability.

Another reason  amounts to the mentioned above vices, either moral or intellectual, of some free market agents. These diminish the computational power of free markets, hence should be remedied in order to restore a desired level of agents’  computational power and market’s  computability.

At last state, authorities,  mainly governments and central banks, in a period of acute crisis become the lenders of last resort,  necessary to prevent an irreversible economic disaster, as  there argues Roubini in his “Crisis Economics”; see post on Roubini’s conceptual apparatus. 

3. Economic crisis:  either a disaster  or a harsly challenging opportunity

This Section will be continued in more detail to inquire  into the  ideas of  Keynes and of Austrian School, and specially of  Joseph Schumpeter, as discussed by Roubini (see link above).  This issue is worth our careful  attention in  the debate on European integration strategy when  considered in a long run. To avoid economic desintegration, should Europe base on the Austrian or rather the Keynesian strategies? This appears as  the question of  the United Europe’s  to be or not to be.

To be continued.

Posted in Addressing global crisis, Rationalism in Politics | Leave a comment

I. Smart politics, stupid politics,
and the Hayek-Keynes debate

Posted on November 10, 2011 by witmar

By Witold Marciszewski

Once at my lecture on European Integrations,  a student expressed  his opinion  about an  European country (no matter which) that its government is undoubtedly stupid.  I did not object  the use of the word since  it has become fairly common in the political idiom (with Google you may find 80000 uses of the phrase “stupid politics” and almost half milion of “stupid politicians”). It was President Clinton who made the word  popular through the famous motto ot his governance: “It’s the economy, stupid“.  Hence, let us employ this expression freely, though with the obvious caution to use it for cognitive purposes, not for an angry emotional expression.

What would be the opposite to being stupid? Wise? Or rather smart? The latter proves  better in the present context, if you compare the following definitions.

wise =  marked by the exercise of good judgment or common sense in practical
matters;  smart = showing mental alertness and calculation and resourcefulness; stupid = neither wise nor smart, even unable to understand obvious truths.

It is not enough for a full-fledged politician to be  good in practical matters. He  is bound  as well  to be a person with wide theoretical perspectives, and those  need  alertness and a skill of calculation.  Simply,  he is bound to be smart.

Among the most  severe tests of a politician’s  intelligence, there is his capability of  responding to extreme situations, especially managing crises. As for the present global crisis, it needs an intelligent choice between two alternative and opposite sets of measures. Each of them results from a different economic worldview. One defended by John Maynard Keynes, the other one by a group of scholars called Austrian School; its  eminent representative was Friedrich Hayek who had entered a famed many years  debate with Keynes regarding relations between free market and government policies.

Now the question arises: whether  is it  smarter for a politician:  to follow Keynes advices  on economy, or those due to Hayek?  The  controversy of  these two intellectual leaders  is regarded  as a central debate in 20th-century economic thought.  The issue  gets most urgent in the time of global economic crisis. Some economists and politicians see  the way out in the Keynesian  strategy, while other ones claim the contrary. Which choise would be smarter?

Let me encourage  each from among this blog’s readers  to consider your choice: which part you take:, that of Keynes, or that of Hayek? Or else  – of both, depending on variable economic, social and political circumstances of the  time in which anti-crisis measures  should  be taken?

To assist your reflexions, two documents may prove helpful.  One of them is a film on the Keynes-Hayek controversy with some introducing comments. Another one is a comment on Nouriel Roubini’s consideration  regarding  circumstaces to be taken into account  when  deciding between Keynes and Hayek.

Posted in Addressing global crisis, Political axiology, Rationalism in Politics, Uncategorized | 2 Comments

II. Roubini’s conceptual apparatus
for addressing the crisis

Posted on November 10, 2011 by witmar

The core of Nouriel  Roubini’s  brilliant  book “Crisis Economics” (2011)  may be summed up to the effect:  an  important tip on how to rescue  the world economy (and thereby Europe’s economic integration)  may come from an unexpected source.  To wit, from  combining  two  approaches, so far regarded as antythetical  to each other: that of Hayek (with the whole Austrian School) and that of Keynes.  Roubini is the one who recognized that  they can and should be linked into a coherent  system of thought.

This is convincingly expounded  in Chapter 2,  Section “To Austria and back”  (p.28), of the said volume. The key to such a synthesis lies in distinguishing between long-term strategy and short-term strategy.  We read in that Section:  “Joseph Schumpeter  [a prominent Austrian economist] developed  a powerful  theory  of  entrepreneurship that  is often  distilled  down to  a pair of powerful  words: creative  destruction“; this   is a sharper  version of some views of  Hayek.  Roubini continues as follows.

In  Schumpeter’ worldview, capitalism consists of waves of innovation  in prosperous times, followed by a brutal  winnowing in times of depression.  This winnowing is to be neither avoided nor minimized: it is a painful but positive adjustment, whose survivors will create a new economic  order.

In principle, Roubini approves such  a harsh approach.  This  implies that no actions should be taken by governments or central banks   to rescue entrepreneurs who collapse for their recklessness; “in principle” means here “in long distance”. However, this position – claims Roubini – should be completed with the following consideration.

The  Austrian  approach  is  misguided  when  it  comes  to short-term  policies.  As Keynes recognized, in the absence  of  government  intervention,  a  crisis  caused  by  financial excesses can  become  an  outright  depression,  and  what  begins  as  a reasonable  retreat  from  risk  can  turn  into  a rout.   When   the  animal   spirits   [i.e.,  businessmen'  bold initiatives resulting in free market]  of   capitalism   vanish,   the    creative destruction    hailed   by   the Austrians   can   swiftly   turn   into   a   self-fulfilling   collapse   of   private   aggregate   demand.   As   a  consequence,  distressed  but  still-solvent  firms,  banks,  and households  can  no  longer  gain  access  to the  credit  necessary  for their  continued  survival.  It s  one  thing  if  truly  insolvent  banks,   firms,   and individual  households  go   under;   it s   another altogether   when   innocent   bystanders   to   an   economic crisis  are forced  into  bankruptcy  because  credit  dries  up.

In  order  to  prevent  this  kind  of  collateral  damage,  it  makes sense  to  follow  the  playbook  devised by  Keynes  in  the  short  term, even  when  the  underlying  fundamentals  suggest  that  significant portions of  the  economy  are  not  only  illiquid  but  insolvent.  In the  short  term,  it is  best  to  prevent  a  disorderly collapse   of  the   entire   financial   system   via   monetary   easing   and   the creation   of   bulwarks:   via lender-of-last-resort  support,  for example,  or  capital  injections  into  ailing   banks.   It is   also best   to prop  up  aggregate  demand  through  stimulus  spending  and tax  cuts.  Doing  so  will  prevent  a  financial crisis   from   turning into   something   comparable   to  the   Great Depression.

To sum up, Roubini’s conceptual project consists in reconciling  the both opposing theories by assigning each of them a different role in the fight with the global crisis. These theories  prove to complete each other, if reasonably applied in changing circumstances.  Hence, the lesson to be learnt is to the effect that  both  sets of  proposals  should be carefully considered,  not only by professionals alone, but by all responsible citizens as well.

Once more lesson is worth considering, namely the occurence of the word “reckoning” by the end of the section in the following context: “a necessary reckoning  must take place over the longer term in order to achieve  a return to prosperity”.  The term “reckoning”, which means computation, is crucial for economics, and for understading the mechanics of crises, as discussed in the post III on cognitive power of free market.

It would be nice to sum up such a solemn discourse in a more relaxed mood.  Fortunately, for this purpose we got a hilarious  piece of music and piece of verse in the best  rap style. One in which Keynes’ and Hayek’s eagerness in defending their points gets shown in a much funny way.  It is the video “Fear the Boom and Bust“.  The  title goes to the heart of  crisis economics, since excessive and euphoric  booms, called bubbles,  do lead to depressing busts.  After such a bust may come recovery, but the whole process is very costly.  The Austrians, and mostly Hayek,  have become classics in studying  such cycles. Thus that funny film deals with serious economic issues.

A note about the book and Nouriel Roubini. The book is co-authored by Stephen Mihm. It bears the subtitle “A crash course in the future of finance”. At the cover, the   name of Roubini is followed by the phrase “The seer who saw it coming”, taken from a review in “The New York Times”. In fact, Roubini was among those few, who have foreseen  the disaster, having been  much ahaed in spotting this event. This is why his opinion and his analysis weighs now so heavily.

Posted in Addressing global crisis, Rationalism in Politics | Leave a comment

Is it possible for Christianity to contribute
to the future of European integration?

Posted on October 10, 2011 by witmar

§1. The impulse to include this question into the curriculum “European Integration” came from an unexpected result of Polish parliamentary elections in October 2011. I mean a splendid performance of the anti-clerical party that wants to cut down the influence of the Catholic Church in Poland – Janusz Polikot’s movement. This fact should be seriously considered to be a sign of times. The fact that Mr. Palikot in a few months managed to win one tenth of the electorate for his programme, appealing mainly to young people, and all that happened in the country seen as strongly catholic and conservative, gets thought-provoking, indeed.

This is the more remarkable that it complies with the trend towards secularization within Europe as a whole. Thus there arises for Poland the dilemma: whether to join this trend or to oppose it? The latter option would accord with Polish historical tradition, but then, in turn, the question arises of how would this tradition face challenges of modernisation. Should Polish people give up the quest for it in favour of being true to their traditions (as claimed by some politico-religious circles)? Or depart from these national and religious traditions in favour of modernisation? Or else, try to reconcile both values? The third option presupposes a possibility of such reconciliation. Is this supposition likely to be true? This is the question!

To address this question, we need, first, to get a clear insight into the idea of  modernization, and then to confront it with the Christian doctrine. I shall do the former, while the latter I expect to be answered by readers by themselves, owing to their own knowledge. In order to help answering, I suggest a list of questions to    encourage and guide a search for solutions.

§2. It is not by accident that in the title of this post I mention just the future. As for the past,  it is by no means controversial that Christianity was among the main factors in the process of forming Europe, having  remained  in harmony with the other potent factors, as the heritage of Greek and hellenistic intellectual achievements.  As well as the idea of universal empire due to the lasting historical memory of Roman empire, its legal order,  its power and its role for the world peace (Pax Romana).  This was a monumental  historical scenario which started with the baptism of Clovis (496?),  the first king of the Franks, and culminated with the crowning of Charlemagne as Holy Roman Emperor on Christmas of 800 by the Pope Leo III.

Within the thousand years  following Clovis’ baptism,  the Catholic Church was a leading force in intellectual and  political processes going on in Europe.  A decline of this domination started because of two new factors which appeared at the European stage. These were: the religious reformation, which was rather like a religious revolution, and the scientific revolution due to Copernicus and Galileo. The former subverted the religious foundatons,  the latter -  the intellectual foundations of the medieval order. Thus began the retreat of Catholic Churche from Europe’s historical stage. This process  is going on till to day, leaving ever less place for the Church’s leadership and influence.

This is the historical context in which  we are to try understanding the core of modernisation processes.  Religious reformers introduced (even if not intentionally) the pluralism of  theological doctrtines,  thus initiating the paradigm of pluralism which evolved towards the freedom of all beliefs including philosophical, political,  artistic, and so on.   Such a pluralism is found among the main points of post-medieval modernity. Then modernisation means tending to  pluralism wherever is it lacking.  [1] Does the Catholic Church approve of such a multiple pluralism?  (Bracketed numbers hint at the position of the given issue at  the list of questions at the end of this post.)

The answer  is to the effect that the Church does approve of pluralism after the Vatican Council II,  but she has done so under the pression of secular thought, not on the basis of her own  creed.  This observation is backed by an extensive evidence, in particular “The Syllabus of Errors Condemned by Pius IX” published in 1864.  It consists 0f 80 items, each of them being  a view which the Pope condemns, hence the contrary view is that  demanded by the Church.  Direct or indirect condemnation of pluralism is stated in items 11-17, 22, 24, 48, 57; items 77-80  express a strong rejection of any form of liberalism.  Let it be added that item 55 declares separation of state and Church as contrary to the Catholic faith, and item 63  forbids any opposition against crowned rulers.

If  the popes who  presided the Vatican Council II lived a century earlier,  they would be condemned as heretics by the Pope Pius IX for their being at variance with all the Syllabus points listed above, and many other ones.  However, the Catholic Church deserves  appreciation for her trying to match standards of modernity  created in the age of Enlightenment. Even if the steps toward such adjustment come late, delayed by natural  inertness of great institution,  they give hope that in a future the church may support the modernizing of society.

Posted in Political axiology, Rationalism in Politics | 1 Comment

Computationally motivated pragmatism
versus principialism
in the question of frontiers and limits of science

Posted on October 6, 2011 by witmar

An abstract of Witold Marciszewski’s paper at the conference
“Nauka a utopia. Granice poznania naukowego”
Warsaw, UKSW 23-24, November 2011

Science is construed here broadly as including mathematics and humanities, in the sense of German “Wissenschaft”. As for the distinguishing of frontiers and limits in science, it should be understood as follows. It is the commonplace that “the frontiers of science are by definition continually shifting”,  forming  thus a dynamic bordeline to mark successive territorial wins, while a limit is something static and negative – to mark the line that we are not allowed to surpass.

As samples of such limitations one may mention the following: (i) the scholastic principle that theology constitutes a negative norm (norma negativa) for philosophy, (ii) the Vienna Circle belief that any proposition not being translatable into terms of physics is meaningless, hence banned from science, (iii) the constructivist claim that one ought to construct a mathematical object to prove its existence (which puts outside science e.g. the axiom of choice), (iv) the nominalist position that higher order logics
should be exluded for the lack of objectual reference of their quantified variables (see, e.g., Hintikka’s point . Principialism means endorsing any of such principles.

As for pragmatism, its motto can be expressed with the Chinese saying: “Black cat or white cat: if it can catch mice, it’s a good cat“. Thus, for a pragmatist, either the axiom of choice, or a higher order logic, is a good cat, as it does enable results vital for science, not attainable  otherwise.

Computational motivation for pragmatism can be rendered as follows. Let us not be discouraged by philosophical principialists’ aversions to certain theories, if only these theories either will make possible, or will dramatically speed up, some computational procedures crucial for science. In the paper, two such procedures are considered, one of them presupposing the axiom of choice, the other one — higher-order logics.

The former is hidden at the bottom of skolemization or (in Hilbert’s approach) of the use of epsilon operator. Such devices are meant to algorithmise proofs with predicate logic (e.g., in form of Beth semantic tableaux) up to the highest possible degree (with regard to undecidability of logic). Just owing to such algoritmisation, we get able to harness computers that they work for us provig theorems or assisting us in proving.

Kurt Gödel (1936) pioneered the idea that (1) some proofs, which in the first-order logic cannot be carried out, get feasible in the second-order logic, and (2) other ones which at the first-order level would require time available neither to humans nor to computers, become tractable in an accessible time when performed at higher levels. In my paper I am to report on a very instructive exemplification of point 2 as given by George Boolos with a human-made formalization (“A Curious Inference”, 1987), and to hint at its continuation through a current research in mechanized theorem proving.

To sum up, this case illustrates that the difference between limits and frontiers in science gets in a way reflected in a crucial difference between robots and human beings. A robot equipped with algorithms based, say, on the first-order logic is strictly limited, being unable to perform proofs requiring higher-orders. It is up to a human researcher, who feels himself like a computational pragmatist, to create the second-order logic, and some rooted in it problem-solving programs; and still, face the risk of being accused of platonism by learned collegaues. If the second-order logic fails to algorithmically solve problems arising in it, the pragmatic human mind is free to give life to an algorithmised third-order logic, and so on — potentially — up to infinity to which there tends such a sequence of succsessively advancing frontiers.

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Abstract of “Mathesis Universalis Revisited”

Posted on October 1, 2011 by witmar

This post completes the paper “Mathesis Universalis revisited owing to Cantor, Frege, Einstein and Gödel“, offered as a contribution to the Poznań, October 2011, Conference on the Philosophy of Mathematics and Informatics. It is both an abstract and an additional comment involving questions to initiate a discussion.

1. The paper argues that the 17th century program of Mathesis Universalis (MU) gets accomplished in our times though in a fairly different way; the difference is thought-provoking too, and this is the other reason to revisite that famous project.

2. In the new MU, unlike the old one, we have a clear awareness of the enormous complexity of some algorithms, the physical universe, human mind, and human civilization, this complexity resulting in some unsolvable problems; such critical awareness was alien to our ancestors. It was Einstein who with general relativity paved the way to the idea of the evolving universe, and soon people conceived that its evolution tends toward ever more complex structures, up to living cells and further. As far as the complexity reaches the heights involvig infinity (like in Turing’s diagonal argument revealing the existence of unsolvable problems), the way to its treatment has been prepared by Cantor.

3. Leibniz’s project of universal langauage, which due to its precision would enable to solve any well-stated problem whatever, has been carried out by Frege, followed by Hilbert, as far as possible, up to the point in which Gödel (addressing Hilbert’s problems) could have discovered its dramatic limitations (they should have surprised Leibniz enormously, had he got a message about them).

4. However, Gödel’s results do not imply an epistemological pessimism. In his short but enormously seminal communication “Über die Länge von Beweisen” (1936) he reveals the perspective of never ending, but fruitful with each successive stage, process of discovering ever more sophisticated mathematical truths. Those, let mi add, should enable handling ever more complex phenomena, e.g. providing more and more efficient mathematical models and algorithms for natural science, economics, etc.

5. Gödel’s evolutionary vision of the growing mind’s ability to grasp ever more complex mathematical structures, may be seen parallel to the evolutionary vision of the universe as producing ever more complex physical and intellectual structures. Since the latter has been initiated by Einstein’s relativity, the paper starts from the picture of them both merged in a thoughtful talk.

======================================================

Questions adressed to expert critics

A. Do you agree that in information age the idea in the focus of our worldview is that of computational complexity? If so, how such a worldview should be named and explained? Do you think, that the reference to the MU project, as made in this paper, is a useful step towards the explanation?

B. As for naming, some authors suggest to use the term informational worlview; see e.g. Hector Zenil’s “Seth Lloyd’s quantum universe view“. The Polish counterpart “światopogląd informatyczny” appeared (presumably first time in Polish literature) in the book by Witold Marciszewski and Paweł Stacewicz “Umysł – komputer – świat. O zagadce umysłu z informatycznego punktu widzenia” (2011). Do you regard these terms, English and Polish, as relevant for the worldview focussed around the concept of computational complexity?

C. Do you share the above (item 4) interpretation of Gödel’s paper on the length of proofs?

D. Do you endorse the opinion (item 5) that Einstein has indirectly contributed to the informational worldview with his idea of evolving universe, provided this evolution’s trend toward growing computational complexity?

Witold Marciszewski

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Europe’s Lead — Questions

Posted on September 1, 2011 by witmar
Problems for exercises to the lecture “Europe’s Lead”

§1.1

a)  Find out a counterpart of the term “Homeland Europe” in your native language.

b) Define the difference between HE and EH options. Which option is
closer to those called “eurosceptics”?

c) Konrad Adenauer’s option: HE or EH? Mention his most important political
achievements. How to call the worldview which motivated his activities?

d) Helmuth Kohl’s option: HE or EH? Mention his most important political
achievements.  How to call the worldview which motivated his activities?

e) Charles de Gaulle’s option: HE or EH? Mention his motivation and his
most important political achievements.

f) Which political parties in Poland are closer to HE, which to EH?

g) State your own option and its motivation.

§1.2

a)  Which projects or decisions of UE (besides the mentioned monetary
union) are intended to carry out the HE idea?

b) State and motivate your own attitude to Poland’s joining Eurozone?

§1.3

a) Give definition of axiology, and of cognitive and noncognitive theories of
values. Which theory you prefer?

b) Are there properties of your country or events in its history which you
highly appreciate or are proud of? Give some examples.

§1.4

Consider the last statement: “community’s integration is [always?
sometimes? never?] based on some belief that WE have a lead over other
communities”.

a) In which version (from among the three listed in brackets) you regard
this proposition as true?

b) Support your answer with a suitable argument.

§1.5

a) Let “BFG” denote Britain, France and Germany jointly. Let “pop” denotes
the joint population of BFG, and “con” their joint financial contribution to
the UN’s budget. How may times is greater the BFG share in con than their
share in pop?

b) Is there any relation between the BFG wealth (which makes them so
generous payer to the UN budget) and their intellectual achievents? If you
answer in the affirmative, give some examples of great achievements in
science, technology, economy and politics in each of the countries in
question (at lest one example from each field).

§2.1

a) How do you understand the metaphoric description “civilizational avant-garde”
as applied to Europe’s achievements?

b) Hint at historical examples of events and the processes referred to as
Europe’s failures to match moral standards. Eg., for crusades mention some
dates, motives, results, and your own evaluation of this event (you may
express your disagreement with the author’s negative opinion, and argue your
opinion).

§2.2

a) What is specific in genocide in comparison with other mass crimes?

b) Make a short report (one paragraph) on mass crimes in Rwanda in 1994 to
decide whether they fall under the concept of genocide.

c) Make a short report (1-3 paragraphs) on the history of abolishing slavery in
Europe.

d) Why is slavery inconsistent with the idea of human laws?

e) Define, at least partially (ie. listing not all conditions) the concept
of international solidarity.

f) Give examples of international solidarity in EU and USA policies.

g) To exemplify the successes of European science, quote the Newtonian law of
gravitation (as a mathematical formula), and explain its use in the exploration
of cosmic space.

§2.3  

a) Give historical evidence of rising moral standards and their
accomplishment in Europe since the Middle Ages. A suggestion: start from the
he Council of Constance, 1414: how its Polish participants contributed to the
theory and practice of human rights.

b) Find out definition and examples of exponential growth.

[To be continued.]

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The Informationistic Worldview
Emerging from the 21st Century Science

Posted on August 24, 2011 by witmar

§1. On the emergence of informationistic worldview (informatism)

When looking at the development of European thought from bird’s-eye view,  we observe  three great periods  of  mutual  influences  between the state of science (that is, empirical teories with mathematics) and a dominant philosophical worldview: the theistic (or theological)  period of the Middle Ages,  mechanicistic from the Renaissance dawn of modernity, and informationistic as dawning in our times. If we liked to most briefly define each period with one key concept, we could mark them up, respectively, with the key categories: God, hardware, software.

Dependencies between these two intellectual forces are always mutual though in various proportions;  even in the Middle Ages when theology dominated so strongly,  it was influenced e.g. by mathematics in the Pythagorean and Platonian spirit as well as encouraged matehematicians to bold speculations about infinity (which ancient mathematicians were afraid of).  Impressive examples of the impact  of natural theology (of Platonian  brand) on optics and astronomy are found in Kepler who in this respect continued some medieval threads (Grosseteste’s metaphysics of light, etc).

A next nice example of such a feedback is found at the Renaissance eve of modern  science.  Scientists were  then massively influenced by the mechanicist worldview of the ancient atomists. In turn, as a result of successes due to that inspiration, the mechanicist model of the universe has got firmly rooted in science, and in circles of educated public, till our times.

Nowadays  the time is rape for replacing the mechanicist model of the world by what deserves to be called  informationistic worldview.  Before defining this phrase, I  suggest  that we also accept its handy terminological equivalent to be used interchangeably. Let it be the term informatism which has  gained  a noticeable place in the literature.  When using the latter for the sake of convenience, we shall remember that the full meaning is involved in the original version which has been introduced after the following consideration.

The English language offers  quite a number of adjective derivatives from the noun “information”. Thus we have: informational, informatist, informationist, informatic,  informatistic,   informationistic, informatized. Some of them seem to be synonymous, some not. This a real “embarass de richesse”. Fortunately, a convicing hint  as to the choice comes from an article in the  journal “Information, Communication & Society” (Volume 2, Issue 1, 1999) by Jos de Mul. Its title reads: The Informatization of the Worldview, and inside there appears the key term informationistic worldview.   Its author is Professor of Philosophical Anthropology at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam.  Prof. de Mul  depicts  the mechanistic approach  as descending from the historical scene at which there emerges the informationistic worldview as characteristic of the coming  time.

This is also the point  of  the Polish study which appeared in Spring 2011 (with   Academic Publishing House “Exit”  in Warsaw) under the  title: “Umysł – Komputer – Świat. O zagadce umysłu z informatycznego punktu widzenia”.  Part One written by Paweł Stacewicz is entitled  -”Infomatyczna inżynieria umysłu”, Part Two, by Witold Marciszewski – “Światopogląd ery informatycznej“. The term italicized is one to be rendered with “informationistic”, and so the above  phrases get translated as follows. The book title:   Mind  – Computer- World.  On the riddle of mind from an  informationistic point of view.   The Part One: Informationistic engineering of mind;  the Part Two:  The worldview of the  informationistic era.  Moreover, the term “informatism” (Polish “informatyzm”) is frequently employed throughout the book.

Chapter 16 of this book presents the ancient atomism as a paradigm of extreme mechanicism, focussed, so to speak, entirely on a hardware, with negligence of the role of software in natural and social processes.  Moreover,  in agreement with Mul’s point,  it is acknowledged that mechanicism  inspired modern science in its beginnings and several next centuries. However,  in  the last decades the concept of information processing, conceived as computing,  provides a paradigmatic model for natural  and social sciences.

Informatism emerges from several sources: (i) logical research in the foundations of mathematics and computation,  (ii)  merging of computation theory with physics  (iii) computer technology, (iv) biological reaearch  as in genetics  and neurobiology, (v) some  speculative conjectures about computational nature of the universe, inspired  by the earlier listed  points.

What is remarkable about this worldview, it is the fact that nobody does pretend to be its author. It  is rather a content of  spontateous social awarensess shaped by the participation in the society massively saturated  with digital technology and informationistic vernacular.  This state of affairs forms a challenge for philosophers, in particular those concerned with  philosophy of science and epistemology. Informatism is an epistemological position when cognition is conceived  as problem-oriented  information processing, and the latter as a kind of computing — the main concern of informatics.

Informatism can be presented in one of two ways. One of them would take advantage of the fact that there exist  valuable partial approches which  might be merged into a desirable synthesis. However, this ought to be a huge research project to be executed by a team of first-class specialists in the fields of complexity, computability, quanta,  cosmology (universe as a computer), etc. The more difficult would be such a task  that among the views to be considered some opposite other ones;  then we would be bound to precisely analyze their arguments  before trying a synthesis.  As a material to such processing  one should take into accont,  for instance, Ed Fredkin’s digital philosophy,  John Wheeler’s idea about “it from bit”,  likewise opposing their “digitalism” Freeman Dyson who vigorously defends the necessity of analog (i.e. non-digital) computing.

§2. From insight to algorithm, and the other way round

To define a worldview one should  refer to its main tenets,  especially its key concepts and central questions.  The key concepts of informationistic worldview (italicized below)  are grouped around the pair:  algorithm versus insight (i.e. intuition).  Algorithm is  a way of  mechanical  information-processing, or computing,  aimed to solve a certain problem. As insight also has an essential share in problem-solving, hence there arises the central  issue of the informationistic worldview: how insight and algorithm relate to each other?

Once upon the time,  the concept of insight was not much esteemed by those  so-called analytic philosophers who  saw its place rather in the sphere of poetry, metaphysics, religion, etc. However, the situation is different at the start of the 21-st century.  Let me exemplify this fact by a personal remembering.

Several  years ago a friend of mine acted as the editor of a volume on automated theorem proving. Since he knew about my interest in the subject, he asked for a suggestion as to the title of the planned volume. I suggested “From Insight to Proof” — meaning formalized, that is, algorithmized proofs alone;  for  only such proofs are what proof-automation  theorists are aiming at. Thus the suggested phrase might have been generalized as “from insight to algorithm” (obviously, in that project the more specific title version was preferred).  I was happy to see that  my advice has been willingly accepted by the editor and all the contributors (who belonged to the best specialists in the field). The more happy I was when the volume appeared, and I found in it two contributions regarding  a Gödelian approach to the “insight vs proof” issue which is in the centre of my interests. Such an experience  would be incogitable  in the heyday of Vienna Circle,  that is, before Gödel’s discovery of arithmetical sentences which intuitively  prove true,  but  their truth cannot be demonstrated  in an algorithmic way.

To fully express the main tenet of informationistic worldview, the said phrase should be completed  as follows: from insight to algorithm, and  the other way round:  from algorithm to insight.  This is the  case of a positive feedback being, nicely illustrated with the success of arithmetic.  There must have been a very penetrative mathematical  insight  (of an anonymous Hindu more than thousand years ago) that resulted in the discovery that there exists the number zero to precede one (the idea alien to Greek and Roman mathematicians). This made it possible for the Arab scholar Al-Chwarismi to create algorithms for addition etc. This relieved mathematicians from the enormous losses of time and energy  (as those caused by old Roman notation), opening new chances before their creative thought which,  in turn, could have produced new algorithms.

Such mutual support  of insight and algorithm  belongs to the main forces in the dynamics of human knowledge.  In order to perceive  other forces, and have a look at the whole dynamics (as seen by informationistic worldview), a certain conceptual confusion should be removed.  The concept guilty of  this confusion is that of computing  (see the listing of key notions above)  and its derivative computability.  In the idiom of computer scientists “to compute” means:  to process information exactly according to an algorithm. That  is: to mechanically follow its instructions. These tell us:  (1) how to transform physical shapes of formulas,  (2) doing this step by step, without any leaps of intuition,  (3) up to obtaining solution of the problem in  question  (4)  in a finite number of steps.    

The above procedure can be performed by a human calculator using pencil and a sheet of paper, or by a computing machine  as defined mathematically  by Alan Turing in 1936, and for this reason called  Turing machine.  Now its physical realization is present everywhere as electronic digital computer.  The range of possibilities and the mode of proceding of digital computers is exactly what people call camputing in an everyday idiom.

However, such a narrow  notion of computing  induces  the  crisis of conceptual confusion.  While in the main stream resarch  people stick to the equivalence  of the terms “computing” and “algorithmic digital computing”, there is a fairly large group of dissidents who back their claim as follows.  The main stream definition is inconsistent, since in the accepted at large vabulary of computer science we have the term “analog computing”; it  is what is being done by analog devices, and nobody  refuses to call them computers.  Hence we are bound either (i) to accept contradiction that analog devices are computers and are no computers (as not acting algorithmically and digitally), or  (ii) to more broadly define the notion of computing so that it embrace both algorithmic and non-algoritmic information processing as two varieties of computing.

§3.  Insights in analog computing and in perceiving abstract entities

From among the two strategies stated above, we are bound to follow the latter, if we do not like committing contradiction. This, in turn, implies the duty to explain how broadly should we understand analog computing.  Surely this concept is satisfied by what is done by analog computers. These do not operate with  symbolic representations  (as digit sequences) of,  say, physical quantities. Instead,  (1) they  process quantities of a certain kind (eg. electric)  which represent quantities of another kind  (eg. mechanical), and (2)  such quantities may be continuous. Now,  what about the phenomenon of  insights?

With the computing being performed by analog devices  some insights share  the lack of symbolization and the mapping of some quantities into other quantities.  This is  satsfied, for instance, in the case of car driver whose problem-solving consists of a sequence of decisions.  His inference do not need any  representations by linguistic units.  He reasons with visual representations which are mappings of  what happens on the road.  Also the feature of continuity can be satified in mapping: it is shared by a section of road and its mental picture.  The same can be said about a shooter trying to hit a target;  he acts in a continuous  external environment which he maps in his inside.

The things appear less obvious in a case like that of a preacher who feels, and so reproduces in himself,  the mood of his audience and adapts his performance to such a feeling. Moods and atttitudes are not physical quantities.  However, the  instance may be interpreted as follows. The preacher’s insight consists in an empathic sharing of his audience’s  mood, hence a kind of mapping. This information is by him processed to compute  possibly best reactions to listeners’ attitudes  towards his teaching.

Thus both types of  cases, that of car driver and that of preacher, may be subsumed under the category of  analog computing as  information in them processed  is not symbolic. It  consists of pictures of an external reality which are somehow mapped  in the reasoner’s “inside”  (i.e. his mind? brain?). His reasoning operates not with linguistic units but with mapped pictures.  In driver’s case these are spatial  images of  continuous quantities as distance, velocity etc.  In preacher’s case occur less tangible images of audience’s mental and emotional states, but nevertheless they are mapped, and  the reasoning preserves the feature of operating on  such non-symbolic mappings.

It may seem that insights, as being instantaneous, have nothing to do with computing as being a sequence of steps.  Hower, when  we combine an introspective perception of our insights with what we know from neurobiological research, then  there comes the following understanding:  the experience of insight results from a sequence of events occurring in the nervous system. The last element, being an insight, is one whose we are aware, while the preceding ones (a nervous process of analog computing) are  hidden before the “eye” of consciousness. Thus insights  enter into a harmony with analog computing.

What about perceiving abstract entities,  as sets, functions,  numbers, and in particular infinite numbers?   Infinite magnitudes in no way can be derived  by abstraction from sense experiences. Hence  propositions about  infinities rank as the most spectacular truths of reason.

In this context, it is in order to clarify that the informationistic worldview does not expect any infallibility,  or absolute reliability, from human reason. Similarily,  the sound empiricism does not claim that all sense perceptions are unconditionally true.  The name “truth of reason” hints at reason as the sorce of the given statement, and  at  truth as the goal  endeavoured. A mathematical theorem  which has been disproved  as well as mathematical theorems which has been duly demonstrated are at the same footing as propositions born from reason, and not from another source, say, senses or taste.  Therefore, the term judgement of reason  should be recommended instead of that old Leibnizian phrase, but the latter may be used for historical associations,  provided that  no confusion would arise.

One may speculate that there exist abstract entities which are mapped  in minds in a process of mathematical cognition. However, we are not bound to risk such conjectures.  Should they prove true, then we shall state that such insights are analog in their nature;  but if not, then  we shall  treat them as a separate category. What really matters. it the fact that not all truths are attainable in an algoritmic way.

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Are all things ordered in number?
If so, what kind of number?

Posted on August 23, 2011 by witmar
To continue enter “It from Bit”  in “Our Pub” Library.

According to  the viewpoint  which I suggest to call computational rationalism, the first of these questions  should be answered in the affirmative, while the second remains open,  being the subject of a vivid controversy.  To be ranked among computational rationalists, it is not necessary to have  a solution of the latter question, but  it is indispensable  to be aware of the problem,  acknowledge its import, and tend to finding an answer.

The vision of mathematical order of the world is what the modern computational rationalism shares with  its predecessors — ancient, medieval, and  later  (not computational yet).  The very phrase “ordered in number” is taken from the popular biblical verse (Wisdom of Salomon Book, 11:21):  omnia in mensura et numero at pondere disposuisti. This means: “Thou hast ordered all things in measure and number and weight”.  (This sentence is redundant in meanings, according  to a rule of biblical stylistics; saying  “in number” would suffice alone,  when measure and weight are just applications of numbers.) There is a splendid host,  indeed, of rationalist  thinkers fascinated with this idea, from  its first authors, Pythagoras and Plato (who influenced the Book of Salomon) through Augustine, Aquinas, Da Vinci, Copernicus, Ficino, Cusanus, Galileo, Kepler, Leibniz, Newton, up to Georg Cantor who lifted the notion of number up to infinitely many infinite dimensions.

In modern rationalism  of computational brand there appear two completely novel  points, one concerning practical applications,  the other one connected with  a deep theoretical problem, as hinted  with the second  question in the title.

Its practical  implications arise from  combining the idea  “omnia in numero” with titanic powers of digital computers.  If  all things are defined numerically, then all things, i.e. systems, processes, relations, etc. in the universe can be simulated with computers. Even the universe itself  in its entirety, provided a sufficiently strong mathematics and gigantic resources of energy.  Thus the collective human reason,  which amounts to global civilization, owing to mathematical skills and wonderful technology,  can match the creative divine-like potential  of Plato’s  dēmiourgós (as praised in the dialogue “Timaios”).

While some modern computational rationalists believe in such a perspective,  as possible at least in principle, other ones remain sceptical about that.  This difference of opinions is deeply  rooted in some  worldview considerations.

The belief in the possibility of overall simulation stems from what the physicist Ed Fredkin has called digital philosophy . There is quite a number of eminent physicist and computer scientists  to endorse  this point, often connected with the contention that the physical universe may be a giant  digital machine to compute its own evolution (among the first to claim so was Konnrad Zuse, the German  constructor who pioneered  efficient digital computers  about 1940,  before  British and American constructions).  Then “in numero” means “in natural numbers”, that is, in the mode of computing fully available for digital machines, not engaging  into the inexplorable realm of continuum of real numbers.

Now it is in order to recall that in the uncountably infinite set of reals there is the set of uncomputable numbers whose existence has been proved by Alan Turing in 1936 with the help of Cantorian diagonal argument.  This is a mathematical fact.  Now the question arises about the nature of physical reality: are there in it any  functions  having  uncomputable numbers as values?   If  the answer would be  in the negative, then digital computers  should suffice  to computatioanlly map with simulations, or modelling,  the landscape of physical universe.

Were there in the universe  functions  with uncomputable values,  then some regions of it would be  inaccessible for digital computing.  Then — here a new factor would step in:  a real help might be expected from analog computing, somehow neglected at the present stage of computer science,  but not devoid of the chance of a  successful come back.   Some problems have been discovered which  can be tackled with analog computers alone,  but in the moment there remains open the question  of how much are  these issues  significant for the progress of science.

To  learn more, the Reader is advised to enter “Our Pub” Library   in which   the essay  “It from Bit”  introduces prominent parts of the said controversy, their arguments, and some  historical background.

Witold Marciszewski

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